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Abstract 
 
Sometimes we learn through the use of imagination. The epistemology of imagination asks how 
this is possible. One barrier to progress on this question has been a lack of agreement on how to 
characterize imagination; for example, is imagination a mental state, ability, character trait, or 
cognitive process? This paper argues that we should characterize imagination as a cognitive 
ability, exercises of which are cognitive processes. Following dual process theories of cognition 
developed in cognitive science, the set of imaginative processes is then divided into two kinds: 
one that is unconscious, uncontrolled, and effortless, and another that is conscious, controlled, 
and effortful. This paper outlines the different epistemological strengths and weaknesses of the 
two kinds of imaginative process, and argues that a dual process model of imagination helpfully 
resolves or clarifies issues in the epistemology of imagination and the closely related 
epistemology of thought experiments. 
 
Keywords: Epistemology of imagination · Thought experiments · Scientific imagination · Dual 
process model of cognition 
 
1. Imagination has epistemological import 
 
The imagination is one of the most distinctive and philosophically interesting cognitive powers 
that humans possess. It is also one of the least well understood. Failure to account for its 
strengths and weaknesses guarantees the incompleteness of any would-be epistemology of 
human reasoning.1 The literature relevant for developing an epistemology of imagination is 
complex. There is valuable work done by historians, sociologists, philosophers and cognitive 
scientists.2 Yet, the “epistemology of imagination is only beginning to emerge as a topic in its 
                                                 
1 One might doubt the power of imagination to produce knowledge, although most philosophers writing on the topic 
now take this for granted (including, e.g., most of the entries in Kind and Kung 2016 and Stuart et al. 2018a; see also 
Wansing 2017, p. 2843). A weaker objection would be that imagination is not a “proper” object of epistemological 
study because it is not a “fundamental” source of knowledge. This argument, however, can be run equally on 
experiments, models, instruments, computer simulations, and other tools of science. It doesn’t seem reasonable (to 
me, at least) to deny the progress made by epistemologists on the functioning of these tools just to avoid the 
possibility of epistemology of imagination. 
2 Recent years have seen an “explosion of philosophical interest” in the imagination (Funkhouser and Spaulding 
2009, p. 291). Seminal contributions include Byrne (2005), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), McGinn (2004), Nichols 
(2006), Nichols and Stich (2003), Walton (1990), Kind and Kung (2016) and Kind (2016). 
own right, and no survey of it yet exists” (Strohminger 2016).3 Two obstacles to fruitful 
discourse have been the lack of an accepted general characterization of imagination, and the lack 
of a discussion regarding the form that epistemology of imagination should take (e.g., should it 
be done traditionally, formally, like virtue epistemology, or in some other way?). 
 
The first obstacle arises from the fact that imagination is discussed by many different disciplines, 
with each discipline requiring slightly different things from the concept, and it is unclear whether 
or how these different characterizations could or should be combined.4 To circumvent this, 
philosophers often turn from imagination in general to certain kinds of imagination; e.g., sensory 
versus cognitive (McGinn 2004), propositional versus non-propositional (Walton 1990; Yablo 
1993), enactment versus suppositional (Goldman 2006), and dramatic versus hypothetical 
(Moran 2017, pp. 24–25). Likewise, cognitive scientists break up the concept of imagination into 
processes that are more amenable to empirical study, e.g., counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Byrne 
2005; Kahneman and Miller 1986; Mandel et al. 2005), mental simulation (e.g., Khemlani et al. 
2013; Markman et al. 2009), mental imagery (e.g., Kosslyn 1994; Kosslyn et al. 2006; Pylyshyn 
2002), narrative reasoning (Weisberg et al. 2013) and mental time travel (Botzung et al. 2008; 
Suddendorf et al. 2009; Suddendorf and Busby 2003), as well as memory, dreaming, and 
hallucination. 
 
It’s good to let a thousand flowers bloom, but not enough effort has been made to see how the 
philosophers’ distinctions relate to the processes identified by cognitive scientists. Until this is 
done, philosophers and cognitive scientists will have difficulty pooling their resources to 
understand the nature of imagination. Such cooperation is important for identifying the 
epistemological strengths and weaknesses of the imagination and explaining why some uses of 
imagination are epistemically efficacious while others are not. The account to be presented 
attempts to make progress in this direction while remaining consistent with all current definitions 
of imagination. It combines three perspectives on imagination that form one framework. The first 
perspective takes imagination to be a cognitive ability. The other two are different ways of 
exercising that ability, corresponding to the two processes in the dual process model of 
cognition. 
 
The idea of applying a dual process model of cognition to imagination is not new: hints can be 
found in philosophy by Arcangeli (2017), Gendler (2007), Walton (1990), and Williamson 
(2016), and in cognitive science by Evans and Frankish (2009). This paper aims to install this 
idea on a stronger philosophical foundation, develop it, and then put it to work in epistemology 
of imagination. 
 
                                                 
3 This is also true for scientific imagination, which will be the main focus of Sects. 4.1–4.3 (McAllister 2013b, see 
also Meynell 2018, p. 508), though see Hadamard (1996), Holton (1998), Brown (2011), Frappier et al. (2013), 
Sorensen (1992), Buzzoni (2008), Gendler (2000), Nersessian (2008), Stuart (2017), Stuart et al. (2018a) and 
Clement (2008, 2009). 
4 Strawson writes, “The uses, and applications, of the terms ‘image,’ ‘imagine,’ ‘imagination,’ and so forth make up 
a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too definite. It would be a matter of more 
than difficulty to identify and list the family’s members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood” 
(Strawson 1970, p. 31). For other expressions of this difficulty, see McGinn (2004, pp. 1–2), Kind and Kung (2016, 
p. 3) and Walton (1990, p. 19). 
To do this, we must first overcome the second obstacle mentioned above, which is our lack of 
any detailed explication of what “epistemology of imagination” refers to, and how it should be 
done. This is important given the state of the field and also because it will serve to constrain the 
framework to be presented. 
 
2. Epistemology of imagination 
 
To do epistemology, we study the epistemological properties of certain objects. The different 
ways of doing epistemology vary according to the properties deemed epistemological, and the 
kinds of objects which instantiate those properties. Candidate epistemological properties include 
knowledge, understanding, truth, justification, evidence, and explanation. Possible bearers of 
epistemological properties include mental states, character traits, and processes. The different 
ways of doing epistemology correspond to the combinations of properties and objects that we 
take to be explanatorily fundamental.5 In other words, an epistemologist who thinks the mental 
state of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental has a different epistemological strategy than 
someone who privileges character traits that enable understanding. 
 
In this section, I am not going to focus on the different epistemological properties; I will follow 
the literature in focusing on knowledge.6 I will, however, briefly discuss three possible bearers of 
epistemological properties, namely, mental states, character traits and processes. 
 
If we focus on mental states as the bearers of epistemological properties, we investigate which 
epistemological properties apply to which mental states (commonly thought of as propositional 
attitudes), and why. For example, in modal epistemology we identify a class of mental state (viz, 
belief in modal propositions) and then ask which epistemological properties (justification, truth, 
etc.) we can ascribe to such states, and what justifies the ascription of those properties. 
 
If instead of mental states we focus on character traits as the bearers of epistemological 
properties, we are doing virtue (or trait-based) epistemology. For example, in Engel’s (2016) 
paper “Epistemology of Stupidity,” Engel raises a way that agents can be (i.e., stupid) in order to 
analyze this trait and discuss its epistemological impact on the agents who possess it. 
 
Finally, if we focus on processes as the bearers of epistemological properties, we are doing what 
might be called process-based epistemology. Epistemology in this sense includes the 
epistemologies of perception, experiment, and computer simulation. 
 
We can do epistemology of imagination using each of these three strategies. According to the 
first, we characterize imagination as a mental state, and focus on what justifies the ascription of 
certain epistemological properties to those states. According to the second, we treat imagination 
as a character trait (imaginativeness), and focus on how it affects the epistemological standing of 
agents that possess it. In the third, we treat imagination as a process, single out its epistemic uses, 
                                                 
5 Not all combinations of properties and property-bearers are possible explananda for current epistemology. For 
example, while epistemologists discuss true propositions and reliable processes, it is not clear how they could 
discuss true character traits. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
6 For understanding see Stuart (2016a, 2018). 
and focus on what enables these processes to obtain certain epistemological properties (e.g., 
reliability) when they do. 
 
Each of the three epistemological strategies can inform the others. Knowing which agents are 
epistemologically virtuous might inform us about which processes and mental states are 
epistemologically good (namely, those processes that epistemologically virtuous agents tend to 
perform, and those mental states that epistemologically virtuous agents tend to have). And 
likewise if we begin with mental states or if we begin with processes. Which unit of 
epistemological explanation we take as fundamental will rely on meta-epistemological 
considerations. I will now briefly present some such considerations in favour of pursuing 
epistemology of imagination in the process-based sense. 
 
Most philosophers working on imagination take it to be a mental state. Indeed, “it is an axiom of 
contemporary theories of imagining that states of imagination are mental states with 
propositional contents” (Kieran and McIver Lopes 2003a, p. 9; see the entries in Kieran and 
McIver Lopes 2003b; Kind and Kung 2016; Nichols 2006). Nevertheless, epistemology of 
imagination as a mental state is complicated by the fact that we want to know how we gain 
knowledge through imagination, which already implies that we are concerned with imagination 
as a process. For example, we might draw conclusions that we take to be informative about the 
world from certain imaginings, as we do from idealized models in science. But this line of 
argument highlights the shift from considering the epistemological qualities of mental states, to 
considering the epistemological qualities of a process of inference-making from mental states. If 
we are to do state-based epistemology of imagination, that is, if we are to find out how imagined 
mental states come to be known or play a role in gaining new knowledge, I suggest that the 
imagined content must figure somehow into an argument, inference, or other kind of process.  
This is already implicit in some authors. For example, Nichols and Stich (2000) are interested in 
propositional imagination (a mental state), but when they turn to epistemological concerns they 
introduce an inference mechanism (called the “Script Elaborator”) to explain how we draw 
correct conclusions from imagined contents (2000, p. 35). 
 
Here, the epistemological heavy lifting is done by a process. This is not to say that it is 
impossible to investigate the epistemological properties of imaginative mental states 
independently of cognitive processes, but merely that epistemology of imagination seems 
necessarily to be interested also in the question of processes. 
 
To inquire epistemologically into imaginativeness as a character trait, a virtue epistemologist 
might begin by postulating a spectrum of strengths of imaginativeness. Someone who is too 
imaginative imagines irrelevant things at the slightest provocation in unnecessarily sharp detail, 
for extended periods of time. Someone who is not sufficiently imaginative will fail to look for 
new avenues of inquiry and will have trouble making epistemic progress as soon as their usual 
methods cease to produce results. What we want epistemologically from imaginative agents is 
for them to imagine the right amount, when appropriate. But to go further and say what it is 
about the right amount of imaginativeness that is epistemologically laudable, we have to look at 
particular cases (actual or possible) where the agent imagined “properly,” and ask what it is 
about those proper uses of imagination that led the agent to epistemic success. Proper exercises 
of the virtue of imaginativeness (like proper uses of courage and charity) will be actions. Since 
actions are a kind of process, we are ushered once more toward epistemology of imagination in 
the process-based sense. 
 
To do epistemology of imagination in the process-based sense, we need to know what kind of 
process imagination is. Perhaps one day imagination will be programmed into computers, at 
which point we could characterize it as a material or formal process (see Stuart forthcoming). Or 
perhaps neuroscientists will reduce imagination to neurological or chemical processes. Given the 
current state of research, however, it seems best to understand imagination as a cognitive 
process, like inferring, remembering, etc. This is a natural way to bring together the work on 
imagination in cognitive science and philosophy. 
 
The dual process model of cognition claims that cognitive processes are of (at least) two 
different kinds. I will apply the dual process distinction to imaginative processes in the next 
section. First, we must roughly delimit the general set of cognitive processes that are imaginative 
in a way that captures current conceptions of imagination in both philosophy and cognitive 
science. I think the best way to do this is to portray imagination as a cognitive ability, the 
exercises of which are processes. What I propose is not a definition, but a schema that generates 
definitions, depending on how the three main parameters of the schema are spelled out. Here is 
the schema: 
 
Imagination is the ability to interact cognitively with objects not present to sensory 
experience. 
 
I want to emphasize that this is not meant as a definition of imagination, but as a schema that can 
be filled in to produce definitions of imagination.7 It works by specifying its three parameters: 
cognitive interaction (mode), objects (content), and not present to sensory experience (the part of 
the mode that qualifies something as imaginative).8 
                                                 
7 I think it is tempting to read this schema as a definition because it resembles many existing definitions of 
imagination. Compare the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines imagination as “having an image or concept of 
something not presently perceived” (cited in Stevenson 2003, p. 238). Many of Leslie Stevenson’s “Twelve 
Conceptions of Imagination” (2003) also fit this schema: specifically (1a–d), (4a, b), (5), and (6). This is also true 
for the characterizations we find in Aquinas’s Summa Theologica I 85 ad 3, Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View §15, Ak. VII: 153, and Hume’s Treatise (e.g., I.iii.ix). Among contemporary philosophers, McAllister 
(2013a) characterizes imagination as the mental capacity to conceive states of affairs not previously experienced. 
Similarly, those writing on mental imagery, e.g., Kosslyn et al. (1995, p. 1335), often make claims like “Visual 
mental imagery is ‘seeing’ in the absence of the appropriate immediate sensory input, auditory mental imagery is 
‘hearing’ in the absence of the immediate sensory input, and so on”; Pearson et al. (2015) note that “we use the term 
‘mental imagery’ to refer to representations […] of sensory information without a direct external stimulus” and 
Richardson: “Mental imagery refers to all those quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual experiences […] which exist for 
us in the absence of those stimulus conditions that are known to produce their genuine sensory or perceptual 
counterparts, and which may be expected to have different consequences from their sensory or perceptual 
counterparts” (1969, pp. 2–3). Several of these examples are taken from Nanay (2015), who also holds a similar 
characterization. 
8 Notice that this schema does not include anything about a distinctive phenomenology for imagination. Some 
philosophers claim that imagination has a special phenomenal character (e.g., you know that you are imagining 
rather than perceiving because the experience is different). I think phenomenology can be useful in contrasting 
different mental states, and therefore it might be that phenomenology should be a factor for distinguishing between 
imaginative and non-imaginative mental states. But this schema concerns an ability, and abilities themselves do not 
have phenomenal character. While the ability to imagine might reliably produce mental states with a unique 
 By cognitive interaction we might mean (re)presenting, simulating (as in running a mental 
model), manipulating (as in spatially manipulating a shape, manipulating a scenario or logically 
manipulating a proposition), creating, or something else. Since this notion can be as broad or 
constrained as we like, many characterizations of imagination are possible, from simulative 
model-based reasoning, to representational and recreational accounts, imagistic recombination, 
and first person perspective-taking. We can also constrain the mode to include or exclude 
processes like memory or dreaming. 
 
By objects we might mean physical objects, actions, states of affairs, propositions, images, or 
something else. This parameter defines the content of imagination, and by specifying it, we can 
restrict our characterization of imagination to, e.g., propositional imagination (imagine that your 
father is walking down a street), objectual imagination (imagine your father), or active 
imagination (imagine walking). It may turn out that only one kind of object is relevant for 
epistemology, e.g., perhaps only propositional content is relevant. But this is an open question in 
epistemology of imagination, and in any case, the schema is meant to produce all definitions of 
imagination, not just those that are epistemologically relevant.9 
 
Finally, by not present to sensory experience we might mean not currently being sense-
experienced, never having been sense-experienced, containing at least one element/aspect of 
which is not currently being sense-experienced, containing at least one element/aspect of which 
was never sense-experienced, or something else. This qualifier (in however strong a form) is 
meant to capture what is considered by most authors in the literature a necessary component of 
imagination, namely that imagination must somehow diverge from current sensory experience. 
 
By using the definition-schema we ensure that all definitions of imagination are included in what 
follows, without necessarily approving of any one in particular. All specifications of the schema 
will be consistent with treating imagination as a trait, process or state: imaginativeness as a trait 
is the disposition to exercise the ability to imagine; imagination as a process is an exercise of the 
ability to imagine; and imagination as a mental state is an intermediate step or final outcome of 
such an exercise, or if we prefer, the abstract (usually functional) portrayal of the relation 
between the agent who performs any such exercise and the object of their imagining. 
 
We can now add the dual process model to the schema. 
 
3. The dual process model of imagination as a framework for 
epistemology of imagination 
 
The dual process model is the idea that there are at least two kinds of human cognitive process 
(see Evans and Over 1996; Frankish 2004; Kahneman et al. 1982; Sloman 1996, 2002; Stanovich 
1999). Or put another way, claims about dual processes “are not so much claims about how 
many processes there are, but claims about how many processes there aren’t. And the claim is 
                                                 
phenomenal character, I am not sure this is true, so I won’t rely on arguments from phenomenal character at this 
point. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this. 
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
this: There aren’t one” (Gilbert 1999, pp. 3–4, quoted in Gendler 2007, p. 75). Certainly, not all 
cognitive processes require the same amount of cognitive effort. And not all processes are 
equally accessible to introspection. The next insight is that variables like these appear to arrange 
themselves on different sides of a single divide. Jonathan Evans, one of the originators of this 
theory in its modern form, organizes some of the important variables as in Table 1. 
 
The distinction between these two kinds of cognitive process has been fruitful in work on 
memory (Atkinson and Juola 1973, 1974; Hintzman and Curran 1994; Jacoby 1991; Jacoby and 
Dallas 1981; Mandler 1980), brain lesion studies (Aggleton et al. 2005; Cipolotti et al. 2006; 
Fortin et al. 2004; Yonelinas et al. 2002) and many other topics. The differences between the 
processes are individuated functionally or phenomenologically, and are not necessarily meant to 
correspond to divisions in brain parts or brain activities. 
 
There is debate concerning whether these variables do really come apart so neatly, or whether we 
need more than two types of process to account for human cognition. Evans and Frankish (2009) 
present an overview of these challenges, and new challenges emerge regularly. For example, the 
model has recently been criticized by Westra (2017) on the grounds that “fast” cognition can be 
flexible, and flexibility is supposed to be a trait associated with slow processes, not fast ones.  
 
System 1 System 2 
Unconscious Conscious  
Automatic Controlled 
Low effort High effort 
Rapid Slow 
High capacity Low capacity 
Default process Inhibitory 
Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reflective 
Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent 
Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality 
Shared with animals Uniquely human 
 
Table 1. Some of the differences between the two kinds of cognitive process (for the full list, see 
Evans 2008, p. 257) 
 
The most common worry seems to be that the dual process model is trivial: since each cognitive 
process admits of the distinction, it becomes part of the definition of “cognitive process,” rather 
than a falsifiable hypothesis about cognition. This might be a fair criticism against the way that 
some cognitive scientists understand the model, but it is not effective against the use of this 
account for epistemological purposes. We want a framework for discussing the epistemology of 
imagination at a level that is general enough for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to 
agree on, and this works especially well if the dual process distinction is a constitutive a priori 
principle for research into cognitive processes rather than a falsifiable empirical claim. And any 
claims associated with the model that do stand on shaky empirical ground, like whether 
flexibility or speed are system 1 or system 2 processes (Westra’s concern, mentioned above), can 
be left behind. We are here concerned only with the first three rows of Evans’s table: 
accessibility to consciousness, degree of control, and effort. These are common to all 
instantiations of the dual process model, they are among the distinctions made in what have been 
claimed as early ancestors of the theory, and they are sufficiently accessible to introspection such 
that it is extremely unlikely they will turn out to be false. E.g., it is difficult to see how 
unconscious processes might actually have been conscious all along, etc.10 
 
We can now formulate a tripartite characterization of imagination that incorporates the dual 
process model. Call any specification of the definition-schema, “imagination0.” Whatever the 
details of the specification, imagination0 will be an ability that we have to imagine. Call 
“imagination1” the unconscious, uncontrolled, effortless cognitive interaction with objects not 
currently present to sensory experience, where “cognitive interaction,” “objects” and “not 
currently present to sensory experience” are defined in accordance with the imagination0 that we 
are currently using. 
 
For example, one imagination0 interprets “cognitive interaction” as the creation of mental 
images, and takes the content of those images to be the objects of imagination, and requires that 
the objects of imagination contain aspects which are not present to the senses. In this case, 
imagination1 would be the process whereby we effortlessly conjure the mental image of a purple 
elephant when one is mentioned, even when we are explicitly trying to avoid doing this. 
 
Call “imagination2” the controlled, effortful and conscious cognitive interaction with objects not 
currently present to sensory experience, again, where the parameters of the schema are 
interpreted according to some imagination0. Using the same imagination0 from above, 
imagination2 would be the process that allows us to take the aforementioned purple elephant and 
make it juggle while riding a unicycle down Fifth Avenue. In a particular use of this sort of 
imagination, there will be a beginning, end, and steps in between. The process is consciously 
accessible to us, and requires some effort to perform. 
 
The distinction between imagination0 on the one hand, and imagination1 and 2 on the other, is a 
categorical distinction between an ability and uses of that ability (processes). However, the 
distinction between imagination1 and 2 need not carve out two natural kinds of imagination. 
Aliens studying human imagination might not make it. Perhaps we do only because it involves 
what we feel is under our control and introspectively accessible, which is important for our 
ethical, pedagogical, and epistemological pursuits. 
 
4. Epistemological applications 
 
Several epistemological features follow directly from a dual process epistemology of 
imagination, independently of which imagination0 we choose as our favourite. Imagination1, like 
all processes of its type, can generate knowledge when it is well-trained and applied in relevant 
contexts. Imagination2, like all processes of its type, can generate knowledge when it follows 
inference rules (whether formal, experience-based, theoretical, etc.) on a system whose 
constraints are accurately modelled by those inference rules. Determining those inference rules is 
                                                 
10 A different kind of criticism against using a dual process framework for epistemology of imagination is that 
system 1 processes are not “cognitive,” in the sense that they do not count as thinking, reasoning, or intelligent 
behaviour of any kind (see, e.g., Di Nucci 2013; Dreyfus 2002; Stanley 2011). They therefore cannot form part of an 
epistemological account. See Fridland (2017) for arguments against this claim. 
the central question of recent work on the “logic of imagination” (see e.g., Wansing 2017; Berto 
2018a, b), and also an important project for those working on the epistemology of thought 
experiments (see Sect. 4.3). What is novel is to see that the contributions to epistemic progress of 
imagination1 and imagination2 are very different, and sometimes progress only comes through 
the combination of both. But more on that below. 
 
First, it is important to see that imagination1 and 2 have different epistemological strengths and 
weaknesses. This is clear in cases where one is more reliable than the other. Imagination1 can be 
more reliable when previous experience directs it automatically to produce the correct output, 
while the conscious application of imagination2 would confuse or mislead us. For example, an 
experienced stock broker might correctly imagine1 a crash in the market without being able to 
imagine2 all the steps that would lead to it. Cases of the opposite kind appear whenever we find 
ourselves in sufficiently unpredictable territory (e.g., when we are first introduced to quantum 
mechanics) where imagination1 will produce false predictions by extrapolating from previous 
experience, while imagination2 can produce more reliable output through more careful means. 
For example, someone might easily imagine1 getting rich when faced with an investment 
opportunity, but, if they are not experienced with investments they should carefully imagine2, in 
as much detail as possible, the likelihoods of what would actually happen. (For more examples 
of such conflicts, see Kahneman 2011). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 A chain draped over a frictionless prism 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The chain made into a loop 
Many of the most impressive epistemic uses of imagination will combine the strengths of each 
kind of imagination. Take Stevin’s prism (Fig. 1), a frictionless system composed of a triangular 
prism with a chain of uniformly distributed mass draped over it (see Stevin 1586, 183–187; 
Mach 1883, 24–31). 
 
How will the chain behave? We can put the question to ourselves and see if imagination1 delivers 
a response. Perhaps we find ourselves “seeing” the chain slide towards A, or towards C.11 At this 
point, Stevin asks us to alter the situation (using imagination2) so that the chain is connected 
around the bottom of the prism, as in Fig. 2. 
 
Again, we may ask ourselves what we should expect to happen, and see if an immediate answer 
comes via imagination1. If we don’t get a response, we can also use imagination2: if the chain 
slides towards A, it will slide that way forever, and we will have a perpetual motion machine. 
The same for C. The slightest motion in either direction will cause a perpetual motion machine. 
Imagination1 might remind us at this stage that perpetual motion machines are impossible 
(because if we try to imagine one, previous experience and background knowledge will flag this 
imagining as somehow “not right”—Mach calls this step “purely instinctive cognition” 1883, 
26). So the chain must be still. Newtonian mechanics tells us that the semicircular link of chain 
exerts equal downward force on A and C, so removing it (using imagination2) will not impact the 
balance of forces in the system. We have the same balance of forces in Fig. 1, so the behaviour 
of the system in Fig. 1 with respect to the forces acting on the chain must be the same as that in 
Fig. 2; since the chain in Fig. 2 is still, the chain in Fig. 1 will also be still. This is the solution to 
the initial question, and a wonderful result. But we can go further and use imagination2 to alter 
the shape of the prism to any shape we like, and we will get the same result. The chain will not 
slide. This result therefore applies to any chains (with uniform mass distributions) draped over 
frictionless prisms of any shape, as long as the system is perpendicular to gravity and the chain 
reaches both of its ends around the shape to the horizontal. This result is due to the fruitful 
combination of imagination1 and 2: imagination2 sets things up, imagination1 evolves the system. 
Imagination2 introduces a change, imagination1 tries to evolve the system, and finds itself 
stumped. This we interpreted in a way that inspired imagination2 to explore the scenario further 
until we were satisfied. 
 
The dual process model improves explanations of imagination-based epistemic progress by 
focusing on the different contributions of the two kinds of imagination, each of which is reliable 
for different reasons. I see no impediment to using this framework wherever epistemically-
relevant imagination appears, whether in model-based reasoning, modal reasoning, thought 
experiments, hypothesis creation and exploration, experimental design, or data interpretation, 
though in-depth case studies are required to make this convincing. Instead of attempting this, I 
will quickly sketch how the account deals with two important unresolved issues in epistemology 
of imagination, as well as how it intersects with the literature on thought experiments. 
 
4.1 Skepticism about epistemic uses of imagination 
 
                                                 
11 Or “intuiting,” to allow for the possibility of non-perceptual imagination1. 
There are several reasons one might be skeptical about the epistemic reliability of imagination. 
Two are helpfully identified in the history of science by McAllister (2013a). On the one hand, 
imagination does not appear to be constrained. This makes it misleading as a guide to reality 
(Thagard 2010, 2014): we can imagine whatever we want, including false or perhaps impossible 
things. On the other hand, imagination does appear constrained, and rather severely: we imagine 
only what occurs to us, or what we’ve been primed to imagine. As J. B. S. Haldane puts it, “My 
own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer that we can 
suppose” (quoted in McAllister 2013a, p. 15). 
 
These worries correspond to two arguments that have been used by scientists to contest the value 
of imagination in science, which are labeled by McAllister as the problems of “poverty” and 
“arbitrariness” (McAllister 2013a, p. 12). The poverty of imagination refers to our tendency to 
imagine in ways that are tightly constrained by our previous experience of the world, as when 
people who are told to imagine an alien typically imagine something with two arms, two legs, a 
head and two eyes. The arbitrariness of imagination refers to our ability to imagine anything we 
want: it is underconstrained by the world, and therefore not a reliable informant about the world. 
 
Together, this forms a historical puzzle: how can “the” imagination be dangerously over and 
underconstrained for epistemological use in science? To be clear, this puzzle is about how to 
rationally reconstruct the conflicting expressions of doubt made by scientists toward epistemic 
uses of imagination. To resolve it, we begin by asking whether there is any kind of imagination 
that suffers from both poverty and arbitrariness. Imagination0 can be exercised in under and 
overconstrained ways, but never both at the same time: it would be impossible to perform an 
action that was at once the result of a decision based on completely free choice between many 
equally good options (arbitrary) and also the result of a decision that selected only the first, most 
obvious option, without considering any other options (impoverished). There is no paradox here. 
 
Still, the reasons for skepticism remain, and a dual epistemology is useful for understanding and 
addressing them. Some exercises of imagination0 will be underconstrained and others will be 
overconstrained (though never both at once). Fortuitously, these two causes for concern line up 
with the two kinds of imagination. Imagination2 is under our conscious control, and it is not 
constrained by logic, perception, the laws of nature, or our background knowledge. It is therefore 
underconstrained in the sense relevant for skepticism. Imagination1 produces outputs 
automatically: we have little or no choice in what imagination1 delivers. It is therefore 
overconstrained in the sense relevant for skepticism. Do these considerations show that 
imagination1 and 2 should be deemed epistemically unreliable? 
 
Imagination2 is underconstrained because its processes are under our control, which means we 
can direct it in ways that violate epistemic constraints like representational accuracy. Yet, 
consider computer simulations, which can be programmed in an infinite number of ways, many 
of which would yield false results for a given system’s evolution. This possibility should not, on 
its own, lead us to conclude that computer simulations are epistemically unreliable in principle. 
Equally, the mere possibility that imaginative2 processes can proceed in any direction we wish is 
not (in principle) an epistemological fault, because we can also choose to imagine2 in 
epistemically reliable ways. Thus the arbitrariness objection does not succeed in casting doubt on 
imagination2 in principle, though certainly some uses of imagination2 (like some computer 
simulations) can fail for being relevantly underconstrained. 
 
While imagination2 is the proper target of the arbitrariness objection, imagination1 is the proper 
target of the other. Imagination1 appears overconstrained because its processes are not under our 
direct control: they are constrained by previous experience and background knowledge. But even 
at its most automatic and least conscious, it is still under our control in the higher-order sense 
that we can choose how to train it, and when we should trust it. After many years spent deriving 
results in a theoretical framework or experimenting with a system of interest, scientists improve 
their automatic imaginings about possible behaviours of a system, or the directions in which to 
pursue inquiry. A firefighter automatically imagines a backdraft before opening a door, and 
rightly decides not to open it. It is not, therefore, our lack of control over imagination1 that is 
epistemologically worrying, but our lack of training and experience. And that is, to some extent, 
under our control. Thus while imagination1 is the proper object of the poverty criticism, this 
criticism does not cast doubt on imagination1 in principle, even though certain uses of 
imagination1 can be impoverished in worrying ways. 
 
In sum, imagination0 can be impoverished and arbitrary, though not at the same time. 
Imagination2 will typically be the proper target of the arbitrariness objection, though we can 
choose to operate it in accurate ways if we wish. Imagination1 will typically be the proper target 
of the poverty objection, though it can be trained through relevant experience to produce reliable 
outputs in a given context. 
 
4.2 Optimism about epistemic uses of imagination 
 
Even if “the imagination sometimes tends toward unreflective conservativism and at other times 
tends toward flights of fancy, certain lines of counterfactual thought that are carefully 
constructed and doggedly followed can lead to extraordinary innovation” (Meynell 2018, p. 
508). Optimism about the power of imagination leads to what Amy Kind and Peter Kung call the 
“puzzle of imaginative use” (2016, 1): 
 
Imagination is put to two distinct and seemingly incompatible uses. Imagination is 
sometimes used to enable us to escape or look beyond the world…Yet imagination is also 
sometimes used to enable us to learn about the world as it is, as when we plan or make 
decisions or make predictions about the future… But how can a single mental activity 
successfully be put to both uses? 
 
The puzzle is that imagination is not restricted by how the world is, yet it can sometimes teach us 
how the world is. The puzzle can be addressed in the following way. Imagination0 is the ability 
that allows us to “escape or look beyond the world” and also learn about the world, and it 
operates through exercises of imagination1 and 2. While an entire imaginative episode (e.g., a 
thought experiment) might teach us about aspects of reality while also scorning aspects of 
reality, no individual act of imagination within that episode will at the very same instant both 
scorn and inform us about the very same aspect of reality. So there is no paradox here. Still, we 
are left with the interesting epistemological question of how to combine scorn and respect for 
reality. The key is to see that imagination by its nature always scorns at least one aspect of 
reality, by introducing or deleting aspects, but it can always be constrained in epistemologically 
relevant ways. Training and experience automatically constrain imagination1, while choosing to 
obey the relevant rules of reasoning and choosing to manipulate accurate representations 
constrains imagination2. And it is through these constraints that information about the world 
makes its way from our previous knowledge and experience to the conclusion of the imaginative 
episode: some aspects of reality are scorned and others are not, and it is the ones that are not 
which carry justificatory power.12,13 
 
4.3 The epistemology of thought experiments 
 
There is a large and growing literature on thought experiments in science, with a number of 
positions that aim to answer what is called “the epistemological problem of thought experiments 
in the sciences” (Norton 2004a, p. 1139). The problem concerns the “puzzling fact that thought 
experiments often have novel empirical import even though they are conducted entirely inside 
one’s head” (Horowitz and Massey 1991, p. 1).14 
 
Positions on this problem range across all the major epistemological “–isms,” including 
empiricism (Norton 1991, 1996, 2004a, 2004b) rationalism (Brown 1986, 1991, 2004), 
naturalism (Gendler 2004; Miščević 1992, 2007; Nersessian 1992, 1993, 2007, 2008, 2018), 
phenomenology (Hopp 2014, Wiltsche 2018), Kantianism (Buzzoni 2013, 2018), pluralism 
(Bokulich and Frappier 2018), contextualism (McAllister 2018), and skepticism (Meinong 1907, 
pp. 276–277; Thagard 2010, p. 209). 
 
The modern form of the discussion is due to the disagreement between James R. Brown and John 
D. Norton, a Platonist and an empiricist. Brown writes, “Thought experiments (at least in some 
cases) allow us to intuit laws of nature. Intuitions, remember, are nonsensory perceptions of 
abstract entities. Because they do not involve the senses, they transcend experience, and give us a 
priori knowledge of the laws of nature” (Brown 2004, p. 34). Norton replies: “If this can be taken 
at face value, thought experiments perform epistemic magic” (Norton 2004b, p. 44). Norton’s 
account claims that thought experiments are nothing other than arguments that manipulate 
propositions which are ultimately justified by experience. This disagreement between Brown and 
Norton is the starting point for the rest of the literature. Nancy Nersessian, for example, argues 
that the mental model view (which portrays thought experiments as manipulations of mental 
                                                 
12 This is in line with Kind and Kung’s own solution to the puzzle, which is that “imagination’s ability to serve an 
instructive function depends on the presence of constraints” (2016, p. 13). Their solution relies on two kinds of 
constraint: architectural and those implied by free will. By recharacterizing architectural constraints as constraints on 
imagination1 and those implied by free will as constraints on imagination2, we can speak the language of cognitive 
science and take advantage of the rest of the dual process model of cognition, while avoiding metaphysical 
difficulties concerning “architectures of imagination” and free will. 
13 I do not want to commit myself to the position that imagination is only epistemically efficacious when it is 
constrained by the world, or that imagination always produces knowledge through truth preservation. This is merely 
one way to explain the ability of imagination to produce knowledge. Sometimes, imagination works best when it 
breaks radically from what seemed like reasonable constraints. 
14 Thomas Kuhn’s version of this puzzle is: “How, then, relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a thought 
experiment lead to new knowledge or to a new understanding of nature?” (1964, p. 241). A more recent wording of 
the problem is Norton’s: “Thought experiments are supposed to give us knowledge of the natural world. From where 
does this knowledge come?” (2004b, p. 44). It is fair to ask whether the different statements of this question are 
really equivalent (see Stuart et al. 2018b, pp. 10–11 for other options). 
models) eliminates the need for “a priori knowledge of nature” but also the need to portray 
everything as regimented logical reasoning (2007, p. 126). There are very few if any in the 
current debate who take empiricism and rationalism to be the only two viable options. 
 
Now that most of the possible “–isms” are represented and each has produced an epistemology 
of thought experiments that corresponds with the assumptions of its “–ism,” the literature is in 
danger of stagnation. This is evidenced by the large number of characterizations of thought 
experiments that have piled up. Thought experiments are arguments (Norton 1991, 1996, 2004a, 
2004b), windows into Plato’s heaven (Brown 1986, 1991, 2004), intuition pumps (Dennett 1984, 
2013), experiments (Gooding 1992a, 1992b; Sorensen 1992; Stuart 2016b), manipulations of 
mental models (Gendler 2004; Miščević 1992, 2007; Nersessian 1992, 1993, 2007, 
2008, 2018), examples (Elgin 2014; Ierodiakonou 2018), “props” for the imagination (Meynell 
2014, 2018; Salis and Frigg forthcoming), invitations to imagine (Becker 2018), fictions (Elgin 
2014), tests of a theory’s potential (Bokulich 2001; Lennox 1991), rhetorical devices (Lennox 
1991), and many other things. 
 
It is important to discuss the role of imagination in thought experiments (Arcangeli 2010), at 
least partially because it goes some way toward revealing the assumptions underlying the 
different accounts. I will not go through each of these accounts in detail, but show how, using the 
dual process model, we can get many of them to speak the same language, clarifying the debate 
and reducing the possibility of talking past one another. 
 
Norton argues that thought experiments are best understood epistemologically as arguments. He 
also makes the descriptive psychological claim that thought experiments actually are arguments 
whenever they are performed (1996, p. 354; 2004b, p. 51). When we perform a thought 
experiment, we are doing nothing other than producing or following through an argument, 
whatever else we may think or feel we are doing. Therefore if Norton is right, imagination1 plays 
no role in thought experiments at all—not just epistemologically, but psychologically as well—
since arguments are conscious manipulations of propositions, and imagination1 is unconscious. 
We never argue (in the logician’s sense of argument) without being aware that we’re doing it. So 
thought experiments for Norton are completely located in the realm of imagination2. 
 
Daniel Dennett’s characterization of thought experiments is the opposite. He claims that thought 
experiments are intuition pumps. Here, the core of a thought experiment is the automatic, 
unconscious, intuitive response that it produces. For Dennett, thought experiments “are not 
supposed to clothe strict arguments that prove conclusions from premises. Rather, their point is 
to entrain a family of imaginative reflections in the reader that ultimately yields not a formal 
conclusion but a dictate of ‘intuition’” (Dennett 1984, p. 12). Dennett therefore understands 
thought experiments as powerful producers of imaginative1 responses. 
 
I interpret Brown as claiming that thought experiments use both kinds of imagination: 
imagination2 is responsible for the set-up of a thought experiment, and imagination1 the rational 
insight. This would accord with his metaphor of rational “seeing”: perception (a cognitive 
process) proceeds automatically, unconsciously and mostly without our control, so too does 
rational insight, which has all of the phenomenological hallmarks of imagination1. 
 
Nersessian, Miščević, Gendler, and others who portray thought experiments as mental models, 
will go along with Brown in emphasizing epistemological roles for both imagination1 and 2, but 
they will try to de-motivate Brown’s Platonism by naturalizing imagination1. According to them, 
imagination1 is the result of evolution, tacit knowledge, expectation, and training. No rational 
insight required. 
 
Another view of thought experiments sees them as non-metaphorical members of the experiment 
family, that is, as a species of genuine experiments (Gooding 1992a, b; Sorensen 1992; Stuart 
2016b). This view is compatible with Brown’s Platonism since Brown argues that experiments 
are a good way of opening rational access to laws of nature. It is also compatible with the mental 
model view, since experiments and model-based reasoning can both be understood as 
manipulations and (quasi-) observations of representations. In any case, on a dual process model 
of imagination where thought experiments are a proper set of the general class of experiments, 
all thought experiments must include some use of imagination2, since we cannot experiment 
without consciously intending to. Imagination2 sets up the thought experiment, keeps it on track 
as it unfolds, and helps to interpret what imagination1 produces along the way. 
 
Whatever view we take on scientific thought experiments, the dual process model of imagination 
suggests the following framework for discussing them. Psychologically, thought experiments 
should be understood as cognitive processes. Whether both imagination1 and 2 are involved is an 
empirical matter. If it turns out that both are involved, we should expect that the performance of 
any given thought experiment will rely more or less on imagination1 or 2, depending on the 
performer’s abilities and experience. A child might need to use imagination2 quite a lot when 
performing Galileo’s thought experiment with falling bodies, while the same conclusion might 
come much more automatically (by imagination1) for a seasoned physicist. 
 
Epistemologically, we can focus our efforts more or less on the input of imagination1 or 2 (with 
Norton or Dennett) or we can include the input of both (Brown, Nersessian, Miščević, and 
others). We should be consistent with empirical evidence, however, and not ignore the 
importance of a kind of imagination that is present, nor should we inflate the importance of a 
kind of imagination that is not present. 
 
With these considerations we clarify one way that different positions in the debate have talked 
past one another: they posit different kinds of imagination as relevant for the description and 
epistemology of thought experiments. It also allows us to recast many of the different 
characterizations of thought experiments into the same language. In terms of imagination1 and 2, 
Norton and Dennett form two extreme positions while others champion dual characterizations. 
And if it turns out that thought experiments need both kinds of imagination to succeed, this 
provides support for epistemological accounts consistent with this. In my opinion it seems likely 
that we will need to invoke both kinds of imagination. As Kendall Walton suggests, “a chain of 
imaginings begun deliberately almost always develops further on its own” (Walton 1990, p. 14). 
And the opposite is also true: spontaneous imaginings very often prompt more deliberate 
cognitive work. These psychological connections between imagination1 and 2, if they exist, are 
likely to be crucial for any epistemology of thought experiments or imagination that takes 
practice seriously. 
 
Finally, the dual process model of imagination opens new avenues for the epistemological 
evaluation of thought experiments. To demonstrate, I’ll briefly discuss how it could productively 
complicate the mental models and experimentalist epistemologies of thought experiments. 
 
Nersessian argues that mental model-use can produce knowledge when the models manipulate 
“representations that derive from real-world experiences…[in a way that conforms] to the 
constraints of that context and of the practices in which it is being conducted” (Nersessian 2018, 
p. 322). The dual process model of imagination duplicates the number of epistemologically 
relevant constraints such that imagination produces new knowledge when it (1) draws on 
accurate representations unconsciously supplied by imagination1, (2) operates by rules faithful to 
aspects of the target system unconsciously followed by imagination1, (3) uses accurate 
representations created consciously by imagination2, and (4) operates using rules faithful to 
aspects of the target system consciously created and/or followed by imagination2. On this view, 
the same thought experiment can now be evaluated epistemologically in twice as many ways. 
 
On the experimentalist view, we start by recognizing that the performance of an experiment and 
its theoretical application can and perhaps should be evaluated independently (Radder 1996). 
That is, epistemologically speaking, some experimental manipulations are better than others, and 
some interpretations of the outcomes of those manipulations are better than others. For example, 
there were many performances of the Michelson-Morley experiment, some carried out 
underground, some on hilltops, and some in hot air balloons (Swenson 1970), and some of these 
were more accurate than others. Likewise, there were many interpretations of what this 
experiment meant for ether theory and Special Relativity. This insight transfers easily to thought 
experiments (De Mey 2003; Häggqvist 1996). Schrödinger’s cat, for example, is a good thought 
experiment in performance: it provides understanding concerning the empirical consequences of 
the Copenhagen interpretation, so we still use it to introduce students to entanglement and the 
measurement problem in quantum mechanics. But it is not a good thought experiment when 
interpreted (as Schrödinger intended) as an argument against the viability of the Copenhagen 
interpretation. 
 
Combining the dual process model of imagination with the experimentalist view, we say that just 
like a real experiment, we must pay attention to the epistemological features that give us 
confidence in the performance and interpretation of a thought experiment. But now, the 
performance of the thought experiment must be divided into the set up (imagination2) and the 
“natural” outcome of the set up (imagination1). That is, we must ensure that imagination2 sets 
things up such that we receive a relevant and reliable output from imagination1. In terms of the 
interpretation, again both kinds of imagination will be relevant. Imagination2 is what we will 
typically use to evaluate the outcome, for example, whether we should take some imagined1 
scenario as evidence that that scenario is possible. But we cannot exhaustively explain the 
epistemological quality of the interpretation by reference to imagination2, since some aspects of 
the interpretation will be made intuitively using imagination1. For example, logic and 
background knowledge do not tell us whether a superposed cat is possible in our world. For this 
aspect of the interpretation, we rely on previous experience channelled through imagination1. 
Again, by incorporating a dual process model of imagination, experimentalist epistemologies of 
thought experiments double their available resources for evaluating thought experiments. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that if we want to do epistemology of imagination, we should employ a process-
based epistemology as opposed to a state-based or trait-based epistemology. Further, any general 
framework for epistemology of imagination must be abstract enough to cohere with insights 
from both philosophy and cognitive science, and specific enough to explain epistemically 
productive uses of imagination. This paper presented a framework consisting of the definition 
schema presented in Sect. 2 combined with the dual process model of cognition. I have argued 
that a dual process epistemology of imagination provides useful ways of evaluating the different 
imaginative activities that form part of epistemological uses of imagination. And I have argued 
that such an account also performs well concerning historical and epistemological puzzles about 
the epistemic use of imagination in science, as well as the debate about scientific thought 
experiments. 
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